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Abstract 
 
Platform cooperativism is a movement that criticise corporate-owned sharing economy 
platforms regarding their negative role in generating poor social conditions of labour and 
extracting huge profits simply by controlling the flows between supply and demand. The 
aim of this movement is to bring about a change in ownership structures in favour of the 
platforms workers, establish democratic governance and reinvigorating the notion of 
solidarity. There is however a serious need to expand our current theoretical and empirical 
knowledge regarding this concept. Especially concerning the governance of such 
initiatives which is moving away from centralized top-down decision making towards 
complex multi-stakeholder arrangements. The objective of this thesis is therefore to 
identify the implemented governance mechanisms in a platform cooperative and to define 
the effects that these governance mechanisms has generated in the cooperative. To achieve 
these objectives, an inductive case study was conducted on a multi-stakeholder 
marketplace platform cooperative called Fairmondo. The empirical findings revealed four 
categories of effects generated by Fairmondos governance mechanisms, these are 
navigating capitalism, facilitating democratic participation, enabling mandatory 
transparency, engaging the community. Having identified these four categories of effects, 
four interwoven components constituting a general governance system for multi-
stakeholder platform cooperatives was proposed, which can guide further research and 
practical endeavours. The theoretical contributions to commons governance and platform 
cooperativism is to have shown that similarities exist between both streams of literature 
which enrichens the novel research on platform cooperative governance with empirically 
tested design principles. Additionally, the proposed governance system can act as a tool 
for practitioners of platform cooperativism to analyse and develop their own governance 
structure according to the four components presented.   
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Abstrakt 
 
Plattformkooperativismen är en rörelse som kritiserar företagsägda digitala plattformar 
under konceptet delningsekonomin för deras roll i att skapa dåliga sociala 
arbetsförhållanden samt att extrahera stora vinster enbart genom att kontrollera flödena 
mellan utbud och efterfrågan. Syftet med denna rörelse är att förändra existerande 
ägandestrukturer till förmån för de som arbetar på digitala plattformar, etablera en 
demokratisk styrning samt att återuppliva begreppet solidaritet. Det finns dock ett stort 
behov av att utöka vår nuvarande teoretiska och empiriska kunskap kring denna rörelse. 
Speciellt när det gäller styrningen av sådana initiativ som går från ett centraliserat topp-
ner beslutsfattande mot mer komplexa flerparts arrangemang. Syftet med denna studie är 
därför att identifiera de implementerade styrningsmekanismerna i ett plattformskooperativ 
samt att definiera effekterna av dessa styrningsmekanismer. För att uppnå detta utfördes 
en induktiv fallstudie på ett marknadsorienterat plattformskooperativ som heter 
Fairmondo. De empiriska fynden identifierade fyra kategorier av effekter som genererades 
av Fairmondos styrningsmekanismer, navigation av kapitalismen, demokratiskt 
deltagande, obligatorisk transparens, engagera gemenskapen. Efter att ha identifierat de 
fyra kategorierna av effekter utvecklades ett generellt styrningssystem för 
marknadsorienterade plattformskooperativ som beskriver dessa som fyra sammanvävda 
komponenter vilka tillsammans utgör en generell styrningsmodell för 
plattformskooperativ som kan vägleda ytterligare forskning och praktiska 
implementationer.  
 
Nyckelord: Plattformskooperativ, Allmänning, Styrning, Fairmondo 
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1. Introduction  
The sharing economy was initially intended to express a form of social utopia driven by 
its expected social, economic and environmental sustainability effects (Botsman 2010). 
According to Frenken and Schor (2017), the actual effects of sharing economy platforms 
are still largely unknown due to the lack of sufficient empirical evidence, although they 
acknowledge that the alleged benefits of the sharing economy are much more complex 
than initially assumed. In recent years, the development of sharing economy platforms has 
significantly taken a more commercial turn which has resulted in an increase of scepticism 
and criticism regarding the concept (Codagnone & Martens 2016). This turn to 
commercialisation has subsequently shaped the current conflictual climate that surrounds 
the sharing economy concept which has generated several alternate definitions, each 
describing their own perception and critiques of the concept (Codagnone, Biagi & Abadie 
2016).  
 
In response to this growing criticism of contemporary platforms under the sharing 
economy umbrella, a new alternative has emerged in the form of platform cooperativism.  
Platform cooperativism is a movement that criticise corporate-owned sharing economy 
platforms in their negative role in generating poor social conditions of labour and 
extracting huge profits simply by controlling the flows between supply and demand 
(Bauwens & Niaros 2017).  The aim of this movement is to bring about a change in 
ownership structures in favour of the platforms workers, establish democratic governance 
and reinvigorating the notion of solidarity (Scholz 2016a). To do this, platform 
cooperativism advocates multi-stakeholder or membership-owned platforms that perform 
the same function as contemporary sharing economy platforms, but without the additional 
extraction of value from the peer to peer exchanges (Bauwens & Niaros 2017). Although 
a recent concept, there are currently 69 active cooperative platforms worldwide making it 
a serious and vital alternative (Platform Cooperativism Consortium 2016b). There is 
however a serious need to expand our current theoretical and empirical knowledge 
regarding this concept, especially concerning a core challenge of such initiatives which is 
governance (Scholz 2016a).  
 
Due to its application in different scientific fields of study, the concept of governance has 
been defined in several diverse ways (Berle & Means 1932; Jensen & Meckling 1976 
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Ostrom 1990; Glasbergen et al. 2007). On a general level however, governance studies 
examine the process of giving overall direction to an enterprise and to monitor and control 
the executive actions of management (Tricker 1984). For the purpose of this thesis, 
governance studies are perceived as a tool used in furthering our understanding of the 
emergence of complex hybrid and entirely new forms of coordination and regulation 
activities in contemporary society (Stöhr 2013). In relation to platform cooperativism, this 
refers specifically to that the governance of such initiatives is moving away from 
centralized top-down decision-making processes towards complex multi-stakeholder 
arrangements.  
 
According to Benkler (2016), the primary resource to guide the development of an 
effective governance of platform cooperatives should be the stream of literature on 
commons governance by Elinor Ostrom (1990), which focuses on how the governance of 
collaborative communities can manage their commonly owned resources collectively 
without property rights or government laws. Along these lines, this paper refers therefore 
to governance as a system of public and/or private coordinating, steering and regulatory 
processes established and conducted for social or collective purposes where powers are 
distributed among multiple agents, according to formal and informal rules (Burns & Stöhr 
2011; Ostrom 1990). The central question in the discussion regarding governance of 
platform cooperatives is how could such an initiative govern itself in a distributed and truly 
democratic way. To enable such governance, Scholz (2016a) proposes that the governance 
systems requires mechanisms to facilitate collective decision making, conflict resolution, 
consensus building and a transparent management of shares and funds. However, no 
empirical research has so far been done regarding the practical implementations of such 
mechanisms and their subsequent effects on the organisation.  The objectives of this thesis 
are therefore two-fold. The first objective is to identify the implemented governance 
mechanisms in a platform cooperative. Secondly, to define the effects that these 
governance mechanisms have generated in the platform cooperative. To achieve these 
objectives, an inductive case study was conducted on a multi-stakeholder marketplace 
platform cooperative called Fairmondo. The research question to guide this endeavour is 
defined as follows. 
 
What are the effects generated by the governance mechanisms in a multi-stakeholder 
platform cooperative? 
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2. Theoretical Background  
This chapter will in the first section present and narrow down the concept of governance 
in relation to this thesis, particularly the literature stream of commons governance will be 
presented and discussed in detail. In the following section, the context and concept of 
platform cooperativism will be presented.  The chapter concludes with an aggregation 
between the literature on the governance of commons and platform cooperatives. 
2.1 Governance 
In reviewing the literature surrounding governance studies, it is clear that there are 
conflicting definitions and assumptions of the concept. For the purpose of this thesis, the 
definition of governance refers to complex public or private coordinating, steering and 
regulatory processes established and conducted for social or collective purposes where 
powers are distributed among multiple agents, according to formal and informal rules 
(Burns & Stöhr 2011).  Along these lines and within the context of platform cooperativism, 
two streams of governance studies should be mentioned, classical corporate governance 
and commons governance.  
 
Corporate governance originates from Smith’s (1776) ‘Wealth of Nations’ which is still 
considered as the major driving force for several modern economists to develop new 
aspects of organisational governance theory. Inspired by Smith’s work, Berle and Means 
(1932) initiated a discussion relating to specific concerns of the separation of ownership 
and control in large corporations. A significant role in contemporary corporate governance 
literature relating to this discussion is the agency theory model developed by (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976), which examines the conflicts of interest between managers and owners 
in a cooperation.  The agency theory model assumes that when ownership is separated 
from the control of a large firm, the manager acting as an agent on behalf of the owner is 
prone to creating negative effects such as shirking and seizing wealth at the expense of the 
owner. Therefore, the theory suggests that the owner should implement appropriate 
precautionary incentive mechanisms to deter the managers from such behaviour. These 
incentive mechanisms include monitoring by the owner and bonding by the agent, which 
is undertaken by separating decision control and decision management at all levels in a 
firm’s hierarchy (Fama & Jensen 1983).  
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It has been criticised however that there is a need for new form of governance studies able 
to capture the nature of highly complex multi-stakeholder arrangements in modern 
corporate governance systems (Bhimani 2009). Furthermore, with the development of the 
internet, new governance arrangements have emerged that fall under the category of digital 
commons. Within digital commons, new forms of production communities have emerged 
that applies highly-decentralized coordination and steering mechanisms (Benkler 2006). 
To narrow down the concept of governance, the focus of this thesis will be on the 
governance of such digital commons which will be elaborated upon in the following 
section. 
2.2 Commons Governance 
According to Benkler (2003), the commons can be divided into four types based on two 
parameters. The first parameter is whether a commons system is open to anyone; ocean, 
air, highway systems, or only to a defined group like for example a private golf course. 
The second parameter is whether a commons system is unregulated; unexplored outer 
space or regulated; Wikipedia, library. This thesis will focus on the governance within the 
second parameter, specifically the regulated digital commons.  
 
A cornerstone in the literature regarding the governance of regulated commons is the 
concept of Common-Pool Resources (CPR). CPR refers to a particular type of good and a 
natural or human-made resource system that produces that good, whose size or 
characteristics of which makes it costly to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining 
benefits from its use (Ostrom 1990). According to Hardin’s (2009) tragedy of the commons 
dilemma, these CPRs are at a risk of being depleted or spoiled if the beneficiaries are acting 
only according to their own self-interest instead of towards the benefit of all. As the 
demand for the resource overwhelms the supply, every individual who consumes an 
additional unit directly harms others who can no longer enjoy the benefits. Elinor Ostrom 
(1990) argues that theoretically, there is an alternative solution to this tragedy using her 
CPR-theory.  
 
CPR-theory is concerned with the self-organisation of collective action. Ostrom proved 
through empirical studies that the self-organisation of CPR beneficiaries in form of binding 
contracts among the individuals that solves the tragedy dilemma, whereby the individuals 
design their own contracts in the light of the information they have at hand (Ostrom 1990). 
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Out of the analysis of numerous cases studies on self-organized collective action systems, 
Ostrom identified eight principles for how commons can be governed sustainably and 
equitably in a community, which have become widely accepted within the research 
community and confirmed in many studies (Cox et al. 2010). 
 
1. Clearly defined boundaries of the CPR and the individuals or households.  
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and the local conditions. 
3. Collective choice arrangements, enable the stakeholders to participate in the 
modification of the governing rules. 
4. Make sure that the rule-making rights of community members are respected by 
outside authorities.  
5. Develop a system carried out by community members, for monitoring other 
members’ behaviour and assess graduated sanctions to those who violate 
operational rules.  
6. Conflict resolution mechanisms in the form of low-cost local arenas where 
conflicts can be resolved. 
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize which enables members to devise their 
own institutions that is not challenged by external governmental authorities. 
8. For CPRs that are part of larger systems: Appropriation, provision, monitoring, 
enforcement conflict resolution and governance activities are organized in multiple 
layers of nested enterprises.  
 
There are two unifying factors for these design principles. Firstly, they recommend 
approaches that argue for the empowerment of the local actors. And secondly, the 
communication processes between the actors and arrangements should show maximum 
adaptability to the local conditions and context.  
 
While research on CPRs have been mainly applied within the context of the self-
governance of natural resources, which are considered important to the livelihoods of 
people depending on them, researchers have identified the value of the concept to also 
describe and envision the governance of online communities focused around digital 
commons (Dulong De Rosnay & Le Crosnier 2012; Hess & Ostrom 2007; Van Wendel de 
Joode 2004; Stöhr 2013). In the context of platform cooperativism therefore, CPR-theory 
can be used to better understand the way platform cooperatives govern themselves and 
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their digital platform. As they are addressing the governance of the communities, applying 
Ostrom’s (1990) principles help getting out of the dilemma pertaining to the very nature 
of digital resources and preventing to consider them as true CPR because of such 
differences (Janssen & Ostrom 2006). According to Dulong De Rosnay & Le Crosnier (2012) 
however, there are two points that that should be considered when applying CPR to context 
such as platform cooperativism. Firstly, natural and physical resources are rival, 
excludable and can be exhausted, this is not the case with digital resources which can be 
reproduced. However, if these digital resources have economic features, they may be 
subjected to market dynamics, potentially leading to enclosure and tragedy of the 
commons. Secondly, natural and psychical resource systems are long-enduring local 
communities. Online communities are not localized physically due to the global nature of 
the internet, this does not mean that such communities are not subjected to pollution, 
degradation and community dysfunction. If no one volunteers to curate the resource and 
protect it, it won’t flourish, being it a natural or digital product. 
2.3 Context of Platform Cooperativism  
Platform cooperativism was first introduced in an article by Scholz (2014) titled “Platform 
Cooperativism vs. the Sharing Economy” in which he called for democratically-controlled 
cooperative alternatives to the new sharing economy platforms. Since this article was 
released, the term has evolved to encompass both a social movement as well as an 
intellectual framework. The social movement aspect of platform cooperativism is 
manifested by the Platform Cooperativism Consortium (Platform Cooperativism 
Consortium 2016a) which is a think tank that supports the movement through research, 
experimentation, education, advocacy, documentation of best practices, technical support, 
coordination of funding and events. This consortium promotes collective ownership, 
democratic governance, a decisive commitment to the global commons, inventive unions, 
social justice, as well as ecological and social sustainability through the intellectual 
framework of platform cooperativism. The intellectual framework of platform 
cooperativism has two core areas, communal ownership and democratic governance: 
“bringing together 135 years of worker self-management, the roughly 170 years of the 
cooperative movement, and commons-based peer production with the compensated digital 
economy” (Scholz 2016b, p23). It is this intellectual framework that will now be defined 
in more detail.  
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2.4 Defining the Concept of Platform Cooperativism 
According to Scholz (2016a), the term platform refers to the digital places where social 
interaction, work and value generation takes place. Cooperativism refers to an ownership 
model for labour and logistics platforms or online marketplaces owned by cooperatives, 
communities, cities, or inventive unions. The intellectual framework of platform 
cooperativism is defined by Scholz (2016c) as consisting of three main parts: Firstly, it is 
about cloning the technological structure of contemporary sharing economy platforms. It 
embraces technology but wants to put it to work with a different ownership model, 
adhering to democratic values. It is in this sense that platform cooperativism is about 
structural change, a change of ownership. Second, platform cooperativism is about 
solidarity, which is currently missing in this economy driven by a distributed, and 
sometimes anonymous workforce. Platforms can be owned and operated by inventive 
unions, cities, and various other forms of cooperatives, everything from multi-stakeholder 
marketplaces and labour brokerages to prod-user owned platform cooperatives. And lastly, 
platform cooperativism is built on the reframing of concepts like innovation and efficiency 
with an eye on benefiting all, not just generating profits for the few. 
 
Building upon this definition, Scholz (2016a) provides a set of ten principles to further 
outline the values, rules and guidelines for the concept of platform cooperativism.  
 
1. Ownership: Platform cooperatives are to be collectively owned by the people who 
generate most of the value on those platforms.  
2. Decent pay and income security: The cooperative must provide a decent pay and 
income security for its members. 
3. Transparency and data portability: Transparency is not limited to only operational 
transparency but also regarding the handling of data, especially the data on 
customers. It should be transparent which data are harvested, how they are 
collected, how they are used, and to whom they are sold.  
4. Appreciation and Acknowledgement: Workers deserve the acknowledgement and 
appreciation of owners and operators. The ability of workers to communicate with 
platform operators or owners is central in this context.  
5. Co-determined Work: Labour platforms should involve workers from the moment 
of the programming of the platform and along their usage of it.  
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6. A Protective Legal Framework: Platform co-ops require legal assistance because 
they are deemed unusual. This is necessary when it comes to defending 
cooperatives against adverse legal actions.  
7. Portable Worker Protections and Benefits: Both contingent as well as traditional 
economy workers should be able to take benefits and protections with them in and 
out of changing work scenarios. Social protections should not be tied to one 
workplace.  
8. Protection Against Arbitrary Behaviour: For example, Uber is known for its 
arbitrary disciplining and firing practices. Without a warning, drivers may be left 
without an income. Reasons for the firing of drivers are often unclear as the 
company refuses to respond to the enquiries of drivers demanding an explanation.  
9. Rejection of Excessive Workplace Surveillance: Excessive workplace surveillance 
in the line of worker diaries or constant reviews need to be rejected. Such 
surveillance practices leave workers without much dignity.  
10. The Right to Log Off: Workers need to have the right to log off. Decent digital 
work is to have clear boundaries, platform cooperatives need to leave time for 
relaxation, lifelong learning and voluntary political work.  
 
Although the discussion regarding the governance of platform cooperatives is still in its 
infancy, the current literature has concluded that a distinctive set of governance practices 
and principles is required (Scholz & Schneider 2016). In the following paragraphs, this 
discussion will be presented.   
 
According to Metts (2016), collaboration is essential in the work towards a successful 
governance of platform cooperatives which structures and processes must change from 
hierarchical, linear forms to non-linear, cooperative ones. Along these lines, the following 
five practises for governance are suggested. Firstly, different strategies for self-
management should be explored, gather inspiration from the existing local cooperative 
community. Secondly, clearly define the parameters of your cooperative environment and 
document this through statues, bylaws or contractual agreement. Thirdly, join a 
cooperative network. Fourthly, invest in other cooperatives by pooling funds from 
successful cooperatives in order to help bootstrap new proposed cooperatives. And lastly, 
choose free tools that are enabled by open source software to run the business.  
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From a legal perspective, Orsi (2016) recommends three building blocks for platform 
cooperative governance. Firstly, implement protections against the ability to buy power 
and profits in the cooperative. This means that a cooperative should implement strong 
safeguards against the potential for the platform and any of its major assets to be sold into 
for-profit structures. It is further recommended that a panel of non-profits and other 
cooperatives would be given the opportunity to review any proposed sale and capping the 
amount of sale proceeds that can go to members and sending the rest to a non-profit.  
Secondly, put a cap on pay-outs and compensation. A platform cooperatives statutes 
should implement caps on employee pay, investment return, and other pay-outs to prevent 
stakeholders involved in the platform cooperative to use their leverage to extract value 
from it. This is also to ensure that the decisions made are not driven by the desire to 
maximize gain, but rather to ensure that everyone in the cooperative has enough. The third 
and last building block suggested is to adopt a staff trusteeship model of governance. This 
model views all staff members of the cooperative as trustees who manages the platform 
for its beneficiaries, the body of members as a whole. Practically, this means that every 
staff person becomes a point of accountability for the organization, taking on responsibility 
to listen to and amplify the voices of its members. In such a model of governance, the 
power is distributed among staff and inefficient hierarchies are removed to ensure a great 
deal of agency for each staff member. Furthermore, the board of directors are in this 
governance model described as guardians that oversees activities of the platform 
cooperative and ensures that the staff are tuning in to members in every viable way.  
2.5 Governance of Platform Cooperatives 
This section presents an aggregation of the governance principles for both platform 
cooperativism (Scholz 2016a; Metts 2016; Orsi 2016), and for the regulated commons 
(Ostrom 1990). This aggregation provides an overview in order to convey two important 
insights in the current literature surrounding the governance of platform cooperativism. 
Firstly, how the principles mentioned in previous sections fits into a general governance 
system architecture. Second, highlight the similarities in governance principles between 
CPR-theory and platform cooperativism. This aggregation is additionally used to structure 
the presentation of the empirical data and is presented below (table 1). 
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Table 1. Overview of governance principles in respective architectural block. 
 
According to Stöhr (2013), governance systems of the regulated digital commons has a 
distinct architecture consisting of two building-blocks. The first block is concerned with 
the social organisational dimension of governance, this defines the roles, and social 
relationships that supports choice and problem-solving processes. Furthermore, this block 
specifies the individuals’ relations to authority and procedures for collective decision-
making including conflict resolution processes. The second block is concerned with the 
cognitive-normative dimension which consists of definitions of relevant or appropriate 
problems or issues, the goals or priorities relating to the problems and to favourable states 
Block Principle Source 
Social 
Organisation 
Clearly defined boundaries of the 
CPR and the individuals. 
Ostrom (1990), Metts 
(2016) 
Congruence between appropriation 
and provision rules and the local 
conditions. 
Ostrom (1990) 
Collective choice arrangements. 
Ostrom (1990), Scholz 
(2016a), Metts (2016), Orsi 
(2016) 
Monitors are accountable or are the 
appropriators. 
Ostrom (1990) 
Graduated sanctions by other 
appropriators, by officials 
accountable to these. 
Ostrom (1990), Orsi (2016) 
Conflict resolution mechanisms. 
Ostrom (1990), Scholz 
(2016a) 
Minimal recognition of rights to 
organize. 
Ostrom (1990), Scholz 
(2016a) 
Nested enterprises. Ostrom (1990) 
Implement protections against the 
ability to buy power and profits in 
the cooperative.  
Orsi (2016) 
Cognitive-
normative 
Decent pay and income security. Scholz (2016a) 
Transparency and data portability. Scholz (2016a) 
Appreciation and 
acknowledgement. 
Scholz (2016a) 
Portable worker protections and 
benefits. 
Scholz (2016a) 
Protection against arbitrary 
behaviour. 
Scholz (2016a) 
Rejection of excessive workplace 
surveillance. 
Scholz (2016a) 
The right to log off. Scholz (2016a) 
Use OSS tools.  Metts (2016) 
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of the world, conceptualizations or models of sources of the problems, the causal linkages, 
and strategies and methods to solve problems or deal with issues (Surel 2009; Stöhr 2013).  
 
3. Research Design 
Theory building from cases is appropriate in several different research situations 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007). For this thesis, which focuses on a single 
case, theory building is a more limited possibility since most instances of theory building 
through cases feature multiple cases. In addition, nearly all recommendations for doing 
high quality research in theory building from case studies requires the use of multiple cases 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007; Yin, 2009). However, there is an acceptable role for a 
single-case in theory building when the case is unusually revelatory, or when it is 
extremely exemplar or when it offers opportunities for unusual research access (Gehman 
et al. 2017; Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007). Although Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) 
generally advocate the superiority of multiple cases over single cases, it is also recognized 
that single cases can enable the creation of even more complicated theories than multiple 
cases (Mariotto, Zanni & Moraes 2014). This is because single-case researchers can fit their 
theory exactly to the many details of a specific case. In contrast, multiple-case researchers 
retain only the relationships that are replicated across most or all the cases (Gehman et al. 
2017). 
 
To this end, an inductive single-case study was conducted on a successful multi-
stakeholder platform cooperative marketplace called Fairmondo where the analytical unit 
of interest was the governance of the organisation. This research strategy choice was 
motivated for three main reasons. Firstly, there is no established theory regarding 
governance in the case of platform cooperativism. Therefore, theory needs to be generated 
to develop our understanding regarding this concept using an inductive research approach. 
Secondly, Fairmondo can be considered a unique example of a platform cooperative due 
to its organisational size and substantial economic revenue. And lastly, Fairmondo aims to 
create a highly transparent organisation which presents a researcher with a unique 
opportunity to easily access the data needed to provide a reliable empirical basis for theory 
generation.  
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3.1 Data Collection  
What is typical of case studies is the use of multiple data sources, a strategy which aims to 
enhance data credibility (Yin 2009). The data sources in this case study are divided into 
two categories, primary and secondary data. The primary data sources include semi-
structured interviews, the Fairmondo website and official documents. Secondary data 
includes conference talks by Fairmondo’s founder as well as interviews published in 
magazines. In the following subsections, the way in which the data was collected will be 
presented in more detail. 
3.1.1 Primary Data 
Semi-structured interviews were chosen due to the explorative nature of the study 
combined with good access to interviewees which were selected based on their expertise 
and role in the organisation (Yin 2009). Four interviews were conducted, recorded and 
transcribed, each lasting for about one hour. The informants consisted of a public 
communication manager, responsible for providing interested parties with the latest figures 
related to the development of Fairmondo and the planning of upcoming events. A 
supervisory board member elected by the members of the cooperative, responsible for 
ensuring compliance with the statues and the proper governance of Fairmondo. A 
managing board member responsible to coordinate and be responsible for Fairmondos 
daily operations. And the last informant was the founder of Fairmondo, that has been with 
the cooperative since its inception. Each of the interviews lasted for about an hour, one 
was conducted face-to-face and the other three over skype. All of the interviews where 
recorded with the explicit consent of each informant. The objective for these interviews 
was to reach empirical saturation regarding the actual effects of the formal and informal 
governance mechanisms in relation to the formalised rules provided by documents such as 
the Fairmondo statues (Baker & Edwards 2012). The interview guide (Appendix 3) 
comprised of open-ended questions aimed to grant the informant room to freely talk about 
how decisions were made, the nature of Fairmondo’s objectives, motivation of individuals 
and coordination of activities.  
 
Fairmondo’s website has a specific section dedicated to the task of enabling transparency 
to their members and the public. In this section, Fairmondo has aggregated all the 
information resources related to the following areas of their organisation; all relevant 
business figures, revenues and expenses, tax statements, annual reports, salaries, 
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remunerations and allowances, as well as all information regarding business activities, 
business partners, subcontractors and the marketplace software. An overview of the 
sources gathered from the website is listed in Appendix 1. In practical terms, the specific 
data sources were the interviewees, official blog, forum and documents provided by 
website.  
3.1.2 Secondary Data 
In total, the secondary data sources comprised of four video recorded conference talks and 
two online-magazine interviews, an overview of these are given in appendix 2. Each data 
source was carefully examined and the parts related to governance were transcribed and 
saved in a separate document.  
3.2  Analytical Method  
Having gathered data from various sources regarding the governance of Fairmondo, the 
iterative and recursive process for thematic analysis developed by Braun & Clarke (2006) 
was used to analyse the collected data. The analytical process for this thesis where divided 
into five activities; familiarisation, coding, searching for themes, reviewing themes and 
defining themes. In the familiarisation activity, all collected data was carefully examined 
whilst making brief notes of initial analytic observations. This data was then coded by 
applying labels to each data-item that communicated its relevance to the research question, 
these codes with its related data-item were then collated into a separate document. In the 
following activity, emerging themes where searched for and constructed. These emerging 
themes were then reviewed until all themes were successful in telling a convincing story 
in relation to both the individual data-items as well as the full set of data. After iterating 
through the before mentioned activities, the resulting themes were lastly defined and 
named. Examples of the coding together with the related emergent themes are presented 
in appendix 4. 
4. Findings 
This chapter presents the empirical findings in the following manner. In the first section, a 
general description of the case is provided. In the following two sections the identified 
social organisation and cognitive-normative governance mechanisms is presented. Then 
the four identified effects generated by those governance mechanisms are presented.  
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4.1 The Fairmondo Case 
The goal that guided the creation of Fairmondo was how to build a corruption resistant 
company that remains true to its values and vision, even if it grows big and economically 
profitable (Fairmondo 2017a). In accordance with this question, a multi-stakeholder online 
marketplace owned by its users and with open membership was created with the intended 
goal to benefit the whole of society, not just a limited group of members (Outlandish 
2016a). The motivation for choosing this specific type of business was articulated on two 
grounds (Meaning conference 2016). The first was that by structure, the industry of online-
marketplaces has an inherent tendency to favour large, monopolistic platforms. In 
combination with extractive business models of investment-driven corporations, the 
founder of Fairmondo saw the opportunity to create a marketplace platform that does not 
engage in socially harmful behaviour such as oppressive employee conditions, putting 
pressure on small producers and traders, or promoting excessive consumption (Shareable 
2017). Secondly, Fairmondo recognized that not all co-operatives live up to the values they 
formulate, larger co-operatives often divert from co-operative principles thereby behaving 
quite like classical for-profit corporations (P2P Foundation 2017). Therefore, Fairmondo 
states that it is particularly important to have a responsible, strongly principled and well 
controlled company in this field (Outlandish 2016b). 
 
Following a successful crowdfunding campaign that raised over 200.000 Euros, the online-
marketplace was launched in September 2013 (Fairmondo 2017a). Since then it has been 
further developed by a community of 12,000 users, bringing the platform to a state where 
it can compete with established e-commerce businesses. In 2015, over 2000 members 
invested over 600.000 Euros of shares in the cooperative which was then run by 12 part 
and full-time members of the core team, including an executive board of 2 members 
controlled by a 7-member supervisory board elected by the cooperative’s members 
(Outlandish 2016a).  
 
The marketplace now offers over 2 million products from 1500 registered sellers, including 
a large selection of books and a subscription service that offers a wide variety of fair-trade 
and sustainably produced products (Outlandish 2016b). In 2016, Fairmondo reported that 
they generated a total revenue of 122.000 Euro, this consisted of three major sources of 
income (Fairmondo 2017b). Firstly, as Fairmondo has scaled down their need for a 
physical office-space, they rent out a large part of their offices to external parties on long 
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term leases which generates additional revenue. Secondly, the subscription service which 
provides the customers with fair-trade and sustainably produced products on a monthly 
basis. And lastly, the book sales provided by commercial book sellers that provides their 
services via the platform.    
 
 
Figure 1.  Breakdown of Fairmondos revenue in 2016 (Fairmondo 2017b) 
 
Fairmondos business model is open to third-party businesses as well as individuals who 
would like to sell goods and services on the platform (Outlandish 2016b). There are no 
general restrictions on what products and services that can be offered, apart from illegal 
offers or offers that are deemed unacceptable by the members of the cooperative. However, 
the aim is to provide goods and services that fulfils a set of criteria for fairness, these 
criteria are constantly open for discussion and improvement by members and the broader 
user base. 
 
According to the Founder, Fairmondo experienced some financial issues brought on by an 
insufficient level of revenue and was forced to face a situation of some organisational 
reconstruction in 2016. Today Fairmondo are working with a limited team. In order to get 
the business model viable, they had to cut costs in the form of reducing the amount of staff 
employed. Currently Fairmondo employs four full time employees, offers four internships 
and engages many volunteer workers.  
Commission From 
Sales
5%
Fairmondo Merch
1%
Subscriptions Service
23%
Book Sales
28%
Rent 
43%
Revenue Breakdown 
Total Revenue: 122.006 €
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There is an emerging initiative called Fairmondo UK which is considered a step towards 
building a global network of cooperative platforms for trading goods and services by 
replicating the model from Fairmondo in Germany (Fairmondo UK 2017). The two 
organisations share the same name but are legally independent. However, they share a 
close relationship of collaboration based in their shared values of transparency and ethical 
consumption. Additionally, Fairmondo UK will be launched as a multi-stakeholder 
cooperative that involves all members and stakeholders in decision-making. However, 
instead of using the open-source platform generated by Fairmondo, Fairmondo UK is using 
a third-party open-source marketplace software provided by Sharetribe. 
4.2 Social Organisation Governance  
The social organisation block of Fairmondo governance system consists of five 
mechanisms as defined in their statues (Fairmondo 2015), the general assembly, employee 
assembly, managing board, supervisory board and work groups. The general assembly 
takes place in an offline meeting every year in accordance with German cooperative law 
and consists of the following activities. Firstly, the assembly discusses and votes on 
proposed resolutions which may be passed with a majority voting, provided that the 
resolution does not require a larger majority. Secondly, members determine the chairman 
of the general assembly on proposal of the supervisory board. Thirdly, the assembly votes 
and elects the members of the supervisory board where the term for each member is three 
years. The general assembly can also be held on Fairmondos official website and consists 
of the same activities. All online and offline activities are documented and communicated 
to all members of the cooperative after its completion.  
 
The employee assembly consists of all employees who are simultaneously members of the 
cooperative and meets in parallel to the general assembly as soon as the cooperative has 
a minimum of eight employees. An extra employee assembly can also be summoned by 
the request of 25% of Fairmondos employees. This assembly determines the number of 
managing board members, appoints them for three years and may also dismiss them. Apart 
from this, the employee meeting has no further decision-making rights.  
 
The managing board consists of a minimum of two members and are appointed by the 
employee assembly for a period of three years. If the cooperative does not have eight or 
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more employees, the managing board is appointed and dismissed by the supervisory board.  
Employment contracts with managing board members are concluded by the supervisory 
board in compliance with the guidelines specified by the general assembly. The managing 
board leads the cooperatives’ business planning and polices on its own responsibility and 
control, but always in accordance with Fairmondos basic principles as defined in their 
statues (Fairmondo 2015). To implement a business plan, make investments over € 20,000 
the managing board needs the formal approval of the supervisory board.  
 
The supervisory board consists of a minimum of three members and are represented 
individually by its chairman or his or her representative. The supervisory board monitors 
and advises the managing board via monthly meetings and reports to the general assembly 
which also decides upon a possible compensation of the supervisory board members. The 
work groups consist of all cooperative members that actively participates in the 
development of the online platform or the cooperative in general. It is the managing board 
responsibility to establish specific working groups that formulates proposals for 
development activities and also responsible for organization of these working groups. An 
overview of the relationships and responsibilities of these mechanisms are presented in 
figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. An overview of Fairmondos governance structure. (Shareable 2017). 
Reprinted with permission. 
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4.3 Cognitive-normative Governance  
As previously mentioned, the governance of Fairmondo is guided in accordance with 12 
basic fair principles as defined in the statutes (Fairmondo 2015). These principles are 
inspired from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN General Assembly 1948) 
and aim to consolidate the organisation’s stated commitment to fairness in two ways. 
Firstly, the principles together provide a definition of what fair means in the context of 
Fairmondos organisation who is obliged to act according to this definition internally 
towards employees and members and externally towards partners and customers. 
Secondly, this definition is legally binding as part of the cooperative’s statute and are 
protected by a 9/10th majority. They can only be changed if 90 percent or more of members 
vote for specific changes in the general assembly. The prevailing interpretation of these 
basic fair principles among the managing board must be published on the website, 
including a comment feature in order to enable a discussion amongst the cooperative’s 
members. In the following paragraphs, the four emerging governance mechanisms from 
these 12 principles will be presented.  
 
The first mechanism prompts the cooperative to always opt for sustainable and eco-
friendly choices in all business activities in order to promote responsible consumption and 
fair treatment towards external and internal stakeholders. For the internal stakeholders, this 
means three things. Firstly, a cap on salaries for employees and managing board members 
as well as the highest expense allowances for supervisory board members with a limit of 
not more than three times the lowest salary, provided that working times are equal. 
Secondly, to enable all users of its products to participate in the further development of 
these products. Thirdly, provide all users of its products with appropriate feedback 
mechanisms and discussion forums which serve for public discussions regarding the 
business policies of the cooperative as well as specific questions. For external stakeholders, 
Fairmondo shall always ensure that the business partners also act according to equivalent 
fair basic principles and not to cooperate with capital providers if these claim profit-sharing 
or participation rights.   
 
The second mechanism is an agreement to a consistent transparency in all business 
activities, this includes all relevant business figures, revenues and expenses, tax 
statements, annual reports, salaries, information regarding business activities, business 
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partners and subcontractors. All information related to these areas must be published 
promptly and clearly on Fairmondos official website, provided that the publication does 
not violate legal requirements, and that the members of the managing or supervisory board 
do not expose themselves to penalties or liabilities for damages.  
 
Thirdly, Fairmondo must release all generated knowledge under an open source license 
which allows third parties to use and further develop it free of charge, provided that those 
third parties use an equivalent license. This is specifically relevant for all cooperative-
generated software which must be released under a respective open source license, if this 
is executed in accordance with safety and data protection considerations.  
 
And lastly, Fairmondo also commits to promoting the fight against corruption through 
regular donations to charitable organisations that fight against corruption and shall not 
conduct business activities with the aim of avoiding lawful tax payments. When dealing 
with goods and services sold abroad, the cooperative should always have the aim of paying 
the taxes in the respective destination country.  
 
The identified governance mechanisms in respective architectural block are presented in 
the table below (table 2).  
 
Block Mechanisms 
Social Organisation 
General assembly 
Employee assembly 
Managing board 
Supervisory board  
Work groups 
Cognitive-normative 
Opt for sustainable and eco-friendly choices in all business 
activities. 
Transparency in all business activities. 
Commitment to Open Source. 
Promoting the fight against corruption.  
Table 2. Overview of identified governance mechanisms. 
 
The following section presents the emerging themes that articulates the effects generated 
from the identified mechanisms in Fairmondos governance system.  
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4.4 Navigating capitalism 
The purpose of this theme is to articulate the effects generated by Fairmondos governance 
mechanisms that has financial features. Specifically, the following sections will describe 
how Fairmondo put restrictions on external investments, salary caps, implements a fair 
profit distribution and complications related to funding due to the lack of capital. 
 
Fairmondo has designed their statutes in such a way that no member or external individual 
could have a substantial financial stake in the cooperative. To avoid giving anybody an 
incentive to push for an increase in turnover and profit, Fairmondo limited the maximum 
number of shares that any person can invest at 25.000 Euro. Additionally, the value of a 
share is defined in the statutes, it does not change with the value of the company. So even 
if Fairmondo grows financially profitable, nobody will be able to grow rich through it. 
Together with a limited salary range, this means that individuals whose goal in live is 
collect large sums of money, will have no interest in getting involved in the cooperative. 
 
“We put a cap on the number of shares that anybody can hold. The motivation behind 
this is that nobody can actually make a lot of money with Fairmondo, not though salaries 
and not through shares. The aim with this is to keep out individuals whose purpose in life 
is to piling amounts of money. “-Founder 
 
In combination with these financial restrictions, Fairmondo also clearly defines what is to 
be done if there is a surplus. This is to avoid long discussions and fights over the question 
where and who will receive the profits generated from the cooperative. Fairmondos statutes 
specifically ensures that the surplus will go to the many, not the few. 25% are distributed 
through the shares, nobody can hold a large number of shares, 25% are distributed through 
Fair Founding Points, points that any member can collect by helping to make the coop 
happen. Everybody gets the same number of points per hour of work. 25% of the surplus 
is donated to non-profit organizations, and members or users decide to which. The last 
25% are used to further develop the co-operative.  
 
The majority of Fairmondos capital comes from members of the cooperative as they have 
a principle incorporated in their statutes that prevents them from accepting investments 
from venture-capital. Through this principle, Fairmondo has rules in place to avoid the 
investor-driven dynamics you can find in many start-ups where investors in such 
organisations pressure for an exit strategy or short term profits.  
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Due to the lack of capital, Fairmondo had to reduce the number of members employed by 
the cooperative, which at the time was mainly paid through the starting capital raised from 
the crowdfunding campaigns. As Fairmondo holds monthly budget situation presentation 
with the team, everybody employed by Fairmondo was therefore aware of this in advance. 
This led to a restructuring of their organisation into a setup that could be supported by the 
cooperative’s revenue, essentially making their business model viable. Fairmondo now 
works on a very limited budget which forces them to provide very moderate salaries. 
According to all informants, this restructuring was a difficult process in which the needs 
of the employees, business, and budget limitations was brought into a balance with 
Fairmondos financial situation.  
 
“We had to reduce the team from 20 to 5 persons to make us sustainable and able to 
grow again. Everybody knew it was coming but it was very hard because everybody is 
very passionate about the project, nobody was working for the money. We tried to pay 
decently, and we paid a unified flat salary from the beginning which didn’t reflect our 
revenue. When the budget got tight we had to take these decisions and reduce the team, 
some are still contributing as volunteers.” –Founder 
 
To compensate for the reconstruction and low salaries, Fairmondo has implemented a Fair 
Founding Point scheme, for every unpaid hour contributed, the members received an equal 
number of 200 points. These points are registered in the bylaws and entitle those members 
to an extra share of the surplus once the cooperative works successfully enough to generate 
profit. This exemplifies Fairmondos struggle to run a cooperative business model in an 
economy driven by capitalist dynamics. 
 
“We have to be a company that is fair where the users have the power and so on. But we 
are also in competition with other companies so we also must be a profitable company, 
like a capitalistic company.”  –Public relations manager 
For Fairmondo to be able to redistribute its revenue amongst the members, the cooperative 
must successfully navigate and compete in the capitalist market. Although Fairmondo can 
decide how the processes of their internal governance mechanisms are designed, they 
cannot overcome the dynamics resulting from operating within a capitalist economic 
system.  
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4.5 Facilitating Democratic Participation 
To ensure a democratic governance structure, Fairmondo facilitates democratic 
participation grounded in their statutes which will be further explored in the following 
section. The purpose of this theme is to articulate the effects generated by Fairmondos 
governance mechanisms that relates to facilitating and enabling democratic participation 
amongst its members.  
 
The notion of a democratic participation is built into the legal framework of Fairmondo’s 
statutes, the 12 basic principles ensures one vote per member and that members are unable 
to procure additional votes. The basic principles additionally make sure that membership 
is truly open to all potential stakeholders by defining the value of one share at 10 Euros, 
making the threshold for getting a membership very low even for people with a limited 
income. With this vote, the members can democratically engage in the governance 
processes of the general assembly and employee assembly if the members are 
simultaneously employed by the cooperative.  
 
Fairmondo must organise a general meeting on a yearly basis where its members can 
exercise their democratic participation of how the cooperative is run. Fairmondo provides 
this in the annual general assembly, a meeting that has taken place the first two times online 
and most recently offline in Berlin. In this meeting, the most important and substantial 
decisions are discussed, this includes for example business and organisational strategies. 
Although Fairmondo recognizes the democratic importance of this mechanism, they also 
acknowledge that this extends the decision-making process. This is also true for the 
decision-making processes that guide the operational activities.  
“I just found it a little bit difficult being a cooperative and having to have these long 
decisions making times, if you what to make big decisions you have to talk to that person 
and that person, this makes it difficult to make decisions quickly.” –Managing Director 
There is no formal hierarchal management model attached to Fairmondo's governance 
structure to guide the practical participation of Fairmondos day-to-day activities. Instead, 
they are organising participation in accordance with the governance structure as defined in 
their statutes where the managing board is responsible and accountable for taking decisions 
and the implementation of internal organisational processes. The managing board are 
accountable in the sense that they are elected by the employees. This way, employees in 
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the work groups can replace a management board that ignores them or leans towards 
authoritarian rule, thereby encouraging a culture of mutual respect. The managing board 
knows it can be replaced by the employees, so they have a direct incentive to work for an 
open and respectful organizational culture and to listen to the working group’s needs, 
suggestions and critiques.  
 
“Basically, employees decide who the management board are and that should ensure 
that we have a culture of mutual respect and no hardcoded hierarchies and keep the 
open spirit that we have now. Because if somebody starts playing a dictator, these could 
be put aside and someone else takes their place in the managing board.” - Founder 
 
Which specific organisational process or model that is best suited for the needs of the 
working groups were left to the individuals involved in those groups to decide, this setup 
grants the working groups a certain level of autonomy to self-organise their work effort. 
The work efforts are reported to each other in weekly meetings, a process that is not 
described and implemented in a formal way, but rather inspired from agile methodologies 
like Scrum and alternative governance structures like Holacracy.  
 
“I would personally have wished to have a clearer process, something like Holacracy, 
which could result in extra organisational effort in terms of following the procedures. 
But on the other hand, it gives clarity which sometimes was lacking in our case, we were 
not always clear where everyone was heading we had the weekly meetings but sometimes 
they were probably not sufficient.” –Founder 
 
Although Fairmondo recognize the need for a specific and formulated management model 
to organise and document their activities, there simply weren’t enough resources in 
manpower or funds to fully implement one. Consequently, they are experiencing a lack of 
proper knowledge management and limited coordination ability that is required for an 
organisation where the number of employees varies.  
 
“Another issue is knowledge management, we could be having been better at structuring 
and sharing information. There needs to be a capacity for knowledge management we 
have fluctuations on the team. So, it’s very important to have these things right, using 
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some model with a clear procedure and thing clearly how the strategic integrated into 
our everyday activities are important.”- Founder 
 
To ensure the facilitation of a truly democratic participation, Fairmondo has to commit to 
the notion of mandatory transparency. This commitment enables members to follow 
Fairmondos business activities and their subsequent results thereby allowing members 
easily to detect any deviation from Fairmondos fair principles. In the following section, 
this commitment will be explored in more detail. 
4.6 Enabling mandatory transparency 
An integral function implemented in their statutes is to make sure that Fairmondo is made 
completely transparent, with the exception of sensitive personal data protection. 
Fairmondo is required to publish any information generated by their activities which they 
legally can publish freely available on their website. This includes financial figures, 
business accounts, financial statements and tax returns, business activities. The financial 
figures present monthly updates regarding the sales of the subscription program, the 
number of articles offered, user activity on the platform, sales of Fairmondo merchandise, 
office rental fee and commission from sales performed on the platform. Fairmondos bank-
accounts are made available through the Open Bank Project where all transactions are 
made visible. However, individual transactions are anonymized if the statutes demand 
it. For example, smaller business partners and individuals, the preliminary and written 
consent must be obtained prior publication. The financial statements and tax returns are 
published annually, comprising of the balance sheet of profit and loss account and eventual 
tax returns. Operational business activities such as strategic plans, partnership and changes 
in principles are published on Fairmondos official blog on a continual basis. Although 
ICT’s enables Fairmondo to provide this information to its members and the public, they 
are also acknowledging that it takes up a lot of operational resources to extract information 
and communicate that information. 
 
“We try to be as transparent as possible which is some cases are difficult. Our website 
provides some figures about sales, users and clicks. But of course, it steals capacity from 
doing operative stuff in order to grow. They need to look up the numbers and prepare 
them for our users to view. It takes time, but we need to find a way to provide this.” – 
Managing Director 
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According to Fairmondo, the issue of transparency has always been a challenge, not only 
from a practical perspective. The informants describe a group of members who were 
critical and always challenged the information through the forum. For example, when 
Fairmondo first released the annual financial reports, members started questioning the 
specifics regarding certain numbers in the report which led to broader discussions 
regarding strategy. These discussions raised questions related for example to why 
Fairmondo weren’t reaching out to more sellers and why so little resources where related 
to marketing.  This is of course an important process for Fairmondo, but in their current 
organisational configuration they are unable to successfully make the most of this 
interaction.  
 
“It’s an important membership process that challenges you in terms of getting things 
right being able to justify what you do. It’s a positive process. Although, if you are 
working on a tight timeframe and budget I think it can be too much and was too much at 
some point for us. Which they create frustration from users and members, most members 
where understanding some very critical. “– Founder 
The commitment to transparency as presented in this theme are tied in to Fairmondos need 
to build and engage a community by encouraging a culture of communication and 
participation. The following section explores why this is and the effects generated by the 
endeavor. 
4.7 Engaging the community 
The main challenge facing Fairmondo was how to develop a model that works for doing 
business in an online market dominated by venture capital backed start-up companies, with 
new business models constantly pushed into the market to follow the goal of a quick exit 
for investors and founders. To be able to do this, a fair amount of flexibility and ability to 
take quick decisions is identified as being crucial. In addition to this, Fairmondo is also 
setting up a social business where they must create, develop and manage a diverse 
community of members and keep them involved. 
 
“With a platform co-op, you have a threefold challenge you are setting up a start-up with 
all the business model challenges that you have around that. But also, a platform which 
is involves a lot of specific challenges and in addition to that you are also setting up a 
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social business, you have to build and manage a community keep them involved. It is not 
easy but it’s very interesting and motivating because of these challenges. Many of our 
members came to us because of these challenges.” – Founder 
 
While it’s true that the governance structure Fairmondo has developed brings restrictions 
to the way the cooperative can do its business, there are also advantages over classical 
businesses. Fairmondo can engage with their community more authentically because the 
community becomes the owner of the business. Fairmondo has implemented a binding 
commitment in their statutes to open source software & open innovation. Specifically, this 
means three areas of action. Firstly, the marketplace software is being developed under an 
open source license thus making it possible for developers anywhere to help develop the 
marketplace software. The source code is publicly available at GitHub (GitHub 2017) 
where the software can be verified to have implemented a safe and responsible handling 
of user data. Additionally, the servers on which the marketplace and blog are operated on 
are exclusively situated in Germany and are therefore subject to German data protection 
regulations. Secondly, the forum which aims to facilitate and engage in constructive 
discussions regarding not only the software of the marketplace but the cooperative in 
general. Thirdly, Fairmondo must always use open-source powered software in their daily 
operations, this means that they use software tools like for example Libre, Mozilla 
Thunderbird and Mumble. 
 
The first area concerning Fairmondos development of their marketplace platform. 
According to the informants, this action drained a lot for energy and financial resources 
for Fairmondo before they could release it to the public. Although Fairmondo successfully 
managed to use alternative finance processes like crowdfunding to get enough financial 
capital to get started, they were working on the software as an open source endeavour 
which has its own challenges. 
 
“The software development took a lot of energy and financial resources. And we were 
working on the software as an open source endeavour, where you have many requests 
from all sides, you have sellers with different systems that they would like to 
integrate, they want automation and improvements in the UI. So, we have multiple issues 
to work on and this just meant that we had to prioritize well and at the same time look for 
additional resources. “– Founder 
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To complete the development of the marketplace platform, Fairmondo further engaged 
their community and organised another round of crowdfunding in the form of a campaign 
for increasing their membership. Altogether, Fairmondo has raised 350,000 Euro over the 
course of these two campaigns in 2013 and 2014. The funds raised by the campaigns 
enabled Fairmondo to implement a majority of the requests made by members and sellers.  
 
The development of the platform is continually driven through their official online forum, 
which leads into the second area of action. In the forum, members and the public can 
discuss their requests for changes in the marketplace software and the cooperative in 
general. This forum also acts as a low-cost area to deal with conflicts where members can 
discuss problems facing the development of the cooperative. 
 
“Sellers and buyers can go there to discuss technical issues like bugs in the software and 
some wishes for features.  Sometimes about new products we should make available on 
the marketplace. The sellers are talking about issues about their activity in the systems 
and regulations because of the EU The members only are discussing more issues related 
to the cooperative like you want to change the status and this is discussed for or against. 
“–Supervisory Board Member 
 
The stated goal of the Fairmondo forum is to engage the community in constructive 
discussions in order to create value for the cooperative by inspiring, inform, encourage and 
support the members. The forum is divided into a public part which is free for everyone to 
join and participate in and a member only forum reserved for those that have bought shares 
in the cooperative. In the members only forum, members can obtain additional information 
from the management and supervisory boards to enable deeper discussions regarding the 
cooperatives operational activities. Due to Fairmondos limited organizational capacity, 
they cannot fully engage in the discussions that takes place on these forums.  
 
“There’s a lot of people that are willing to help. They are mostly well mannered and 
want to support it. Some of them are in the forum and writing ideas and criticizing a lot. 
It is difficult, if we had a bigger team it would be easier to engage more in these 
discussions. At the moment, we don’t have a formal process for dealing with this. If we 
had more people, we could engage more with the members in this way.”- Supervisory 
Board Member 
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The third area of action regarding community engagement concerns the restriction to open-
source software tools. This is to engage with the wider community of Open Source 
Software in which Fairmondos ethos is rooted. However, the informants recognize that 
this commitment also comes with the need to reject more common and perhaps more 
practical tools in favour of OSS enabled tools. 
 
“It’s very hard to find your way in environment where you have regulated yourself to 
keep the company fair a sustainable and only use open source tools. On the other hand, 
you have to leave out often very practical tools because your statues. It’s hard to find a 
way through managing all that.” -Managing Director 
 
5. Discussion  
The empirical findings revealed four categories of effects generated by Fairmondos 
governance mechanisms. The importance and implication of these empirical findings is 
that when developing a governance system in a multi-stakeholder platform cooperative 
marketplace these effects should be considered. In the following sections therefore, these 
four categories of effects and their accompanying governance mechanisms will be 
discussed in relation to a general governance system.  
5.1 General Platform Cooperative Governance  
 
Platform cooperatives inherently clashes with the dynamics of our contemporary capitalist 
economic system. They therefore need to possess the ability to successfully navigate 
challenges rising from these clashes. The empirical data suggests that a platform 
cooperative can navigate such challenges by implementing resistance mechanisms in their 
statutes to prevent them from becoming pure capitalist enterprises at the expense of their 
members’ interest and against the platform cooperative ethos. The resistance mechanisms 
identified in this study supports Scholz’s (2016a) proposition that platform cooperatives 
will have to rely on alternative funding schemes because traditional avenues like venture-
capital will often require platform cooperatives to compromise their autonomy and 
democratic governance. Additionally, the findings support Orsi’s (2016) recommendations 
to implement protections against the ability to buy power and profits in the cooperative 
and restrictions on salaries and compensations.  
 
According to the empirical data, platform cooperatives can enable a democratic 
participation by anchoring a democratic governance structure into their statutes in three 
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ways. Firstly, no matter the amount of shares a member has invested in the cooperative, 
members should only have one vote. Thereby clearly defining the boundaries of the 
platform as recommended by Ostrom (1990). This also relates to the principle of collective 
ownership of platform cooperatives as proposed by Scholz (2016a), the platform should 
be owned by the people who generate most of the value on those platforms.   Secondly, a 
platform cooperative should promote autonomous self-organising work through its 
statutes. This enables the employees of the cooperative to explore different strategies for 
self-management of the operational activities as recommended by Metts (2016) and to 
distribute the power among employees by removing inefficient hierarchies as proposed by 
Orsi (2016). Thirdly, democratic participation also includes the notions of accountability 
and transparency. Accountability is enabled in combination with a high degree of 
transparency in a platform cooperatives operational activities, this allows the cooperative 
members to monitor those that are accountable (Ostrom 1990).  
 
A platform cooperative can enable transparency by implementing governance mechanisms 
in their statutes, requiring a cooperative to mandatorily publish all information regarding 
its business activities they legally can and make them available to all members as well as 
the public. This grants a platform cooperative the ability to enable communication 
processes between the members that allows for maximum adaptability to the local 
conditions and context (Ostrom 1990). Additionally, Scholz (2016a) proposes that 
transparency should also apply to the handling of data generated by the platforms users, it 
should be clear which data are harvested, how they are collected, how they are used and to 
whom they are sold. To have accurate and current information regarding the operational 
activities allows the members to monitor and actively audit the activities in the cooperative 
(Ostrom 1990). This provides a platform cooperative with two opportunities. Firstly, to 
allow members to hold individuals or groups accountable for their actions thereby 
enhancing the enablement of true democratic participation. Secondly, the case study 
findings indicate that transparency is an important factor in successfully building and 
engaging the platform cooperative community.   
 
According to the case findings, platform cooperatives are enabled by the community not 
only as a source of capital but also in actively contributing to the development of the 
platform software and the cooperative in general. Therefore, it is highly important to build 
and successfully engage a community that supports the cooperative. If this endeavour fails, 
the cooperative may suffer the tragedy of the commons as no one volunteers to curate the 
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resource and protect it (Dulong De Rosnay & Le Crosnier 2012). To engage and build a 
community around a platform cooperative should involve two primary areas of action. 
Firstly, a commitment to the open source community. This is in accordance with Metts 
(2016) recommendation to choose OSS tools to run the cooperative. Additionally, this ties 
in to the platform cooperativism movements wider commitment to build upon the 
commons as articulated by Scholz (2016a). Secondly, implement a forum that allows 
members and a wider public community to discuss and develop the both the software and 
the cooperative. This refers specifically to the recommendation to facilitate the enablement 
of collective decision-making and consensus building (Scholz 2016a). A forum also grants 
the cooperative with rapid access to low-cost arenas to enable members and employees to 
deal with conflicts between themselves as proposed by Ostrom (1990). 
5.2 Theoretical and practical implications 
 
This study has produced theoretical contributions to the research on commons governance 
and platform cooperativism in two ways. Firstly, this study has shown that similarities 
exists between the established stream of literature of commons governance and the 
emerging literature of platform cooperative governance. Secondly, these similarities help 
to enrich the novel research with empirically tested design principles related to the 
governance of platform cooperatives. The general governance system for marketplace 
platform cooperatives as proposed in this study can be considered as a bridge between the 
two streams of literature upon which further research into other variations of platform 
cooperatives can be conducted. The practical implications for this study is that the 
governance system can act as a tool for practitioners of platform cooperativism analyse 
and develop their own governance structure according to the four components presented.   
 
There are however two limitations of this study which needs to be considered. Firstly, the 
governance system outlined may only be applicable to platform cooperatives whose 
business models are similar to the one of Fairmondo. Secondly, it can be argued that this 
study lacks the perspective from stakeholders in Fairmondo like non-employed members 
and the sellers on the platform. If the study had included the perspectives from these 
stakeholders the credibility of the governance model developed could have been enhanced. 
 
For further research, it is recommended to use the general governance system to analyse 
other platform cooperative initiatives similar to Fairmondo to see if the components or 
their relationships between them can further be refined.   
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6. Conclusions 
This study set out to answer the following research question: 
  
What are the effects generated by the governance mechanisms in a multi-stakeholder 
platform cooperative? 
 
 To answer this question, an inductive single case study with a was conducted on a 
marketplace platform cooperative. The empirical findings revealed four categories of 
effects generated by the governance mechanisms implemented in a platform cooperative, 
these are: navigating capitalism, facilitating democratic participation, enabling mandatory 
transparency, engaging the community. This study can further conclude that these effects 
can be considered as four interwoven components of a general governance system for 
multi-stakeholder platform cooperatives that can guide further research and practical 
endeavours (Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 3. General governance system for marketplace platform cooperative. 
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Appendix 1. Primary Data Sources 
 
Area Information Link 
Financial figures  Annual reports 
regarding number of 
sales and marketplace 
visitors 
https://www.fairmondo.de/geschaeftszahlen  
Business accounts Revenues, expenses, 
salaries, 
remunerations and 
allowances 
https://sofi.openbankproject.com/banks/gls/accounts/fairnopoly-
geschaftskonto/public 
Financial statements 
and tax returns 
Annual financial 
statements and tax 
returns 
https://sofi.openbankproject.com/banks/gls/accounts/fairnopoly-
einlagenkonto/public 
Business activities Strategic orientation, 
partnerships and 
principles 
https://info.fairmondo.de/ 
Marketplace 
software 
Source code for the 
marketplace platform 
https://github.com/fairmondo/fairmondo  
Official documents  Fairmondos Statutes https://info.fairmondo.de/wp-
content/uploads/2013/01/Fairmondo-Satzung_20150131.pdf 
Official Website General Information https://www.fairmondo.de/global 
Appendix 1. Overview of data sources from Fairmondos website. 
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Appendix 2. Secondary Data Sources 
 
Context Title Link 
Conference Paul Mason interviews 
Felix Weth l Platform 
cooperativism l 
Meaning 2016 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TL5tFZS69JM&t=9s  
Conference Rewiring the Sharing 
Economy: Q&A | 
London 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ayUr9OjWi8 
Conference Felix Weth (Fairmondo) 
at Platform Co-ops 
event, London 2016 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9XZEbGVs7is 
Conference Felix Weth on 
Fairmondo and Open 
Multi-Stakeholder 
Coops 
https://blog.p2pfoundation.net/felix-weth-on-fairmondo-
and-open-multi-stakeholder-coops/2017/03/15 
Interview Q&A with Felix Weth 
of Fairmondo, the 
Platform Co-op that's 
Taking on eBay 
http://www.shareable.net/blog/qa-with-felix-weth-of-
fairmondo-the-platform-co-op-thats-taking-on-ebay 
interview Economic Revolution - 
A Co-Op Owned Mass 
Marketplace 
Interview with Felix 
Weth, Founder of 
Fairmondo 
http://thechanger.org/community/economic-revolution-
co-op-owned-mass-marketplace 
Appendix 3. Overview of secondary data sources. 
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Appendix 3. Interview Guide 
 
How do you make decisions in Fairmondo? 
Who takes personal responsibility for decision making?  
 
How do you decide about the nature of the objectives Fairmondo pursues?  
How are the individuals in Fairmondo motivated to pursue these objectives?  
 
How are activities coordinated in Fairmondo? 
Do you have formal and well-structured management processes to deliver outputs?  
Do you encourage a process of informal and spontaneous coordination? 
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Appendix 4. Coding examples with emerging themes. 
 
 
Appendix 4. An overview of coding examples together with its related emerging themes. 
